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The questions dealt with in this special issue are fundamental to the neuroscience of consciousness. They relate, as well, to questions that date from the beginnings of philosophy. We hope this set of articles represents a significant empirical and theoretical advance on these issues, which seem to have been stuck at about the same point since the measurements by Benjamin Libet and colleagues (Libet, 1964 (Libet, , 1973 Libet, Wright, Feinstein, & Pearl, 1979; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Libet, Wright, Feinstein, & Pearl, 1992) raised the empirical and philosophical questions addressed here. These experiments have been taken to imply that perception lags about 500 ms behind events in the world and further that our sense of exactly when we make a decision to act seems to locate the intention about 500 ms after the act. If the intention follows the act, the commonsense idea that conscious intentions are responsible for our actions is wrong. The 500 ms by which our perceptions lag events in the world would put in doubt our impression that perceptual awareness corresponds to reality.
For the conceptual difficulties this research creates, consider a homely example, the difficulties the timing relations make for our notions of conscious intention and action in something as simple as throwing and catching a ball. The delay between perception and reality would make it nearly impossible to use conscious monitoring of the location of the ball to catch it, since in 500 ms it would move several feet and not be where we thought we had to reach. Our idea of when to throw it will also be off and we could not consciously execute the intention to throw the ball at the right time. In this simple case the awareness of action and intention is something of a fiction, and a not very useful one. A generalization of this point challenges basic ideas about volition, responsibility, and the veridicality of our conscious representation of the world. The Sheverin, Ghannam, and Libet (2002) article also suggests that the delay of access to consciousness may involve not just neural delays but active unconscious processes.
As the articles in this issue discuss, a number of solutions to these problems have been suggested. One is that consciousness really is restricted to observing alone, without any capacity for action. Another is to assume ''exotic physics'' in which backwards referral-a form of reverse time travel-takes place to correct the temporal anomalies. Another is to take a close look at the measurement of time relations themselves to see if there really is a problem, and this is one of the major contributions of this issue. Pockett (2002a) and Gomes (2002a) criticize the original experiments and the conclusions derived from them, as does Ramakrishna (2002) Klein (2002) reanalyzes the classic findings, and Trevena and Miller (2002) and Christie and Barresi (2002) present data of their own on timing. In the nearly 40 years of discussion of the Libet results, very little new data have been brought to the debate.
Still another approach, as discussed by Rosenthal (2002) , is to consider the commonsense ideas that are challenged by these findings. The folk concept of volition assumes to some degree that all volition is conscious, that the will is free, and that motives are unitary and initiate action at a discrete point in time. However, if the impulse to act has unconscious precursors, if the sense of the freedom of the will comes at least in part from the fact that the antecedents of the conscious intention to act are unconscious, if the action itself is the outcome of conflict among motives, and if initiation of an act is a process that takes time, the neurophysiological findings may not raise such overwhelming problems. The comments of Breitmeyer (2002), Bolbecker et al. (2002) , Durgin and Sternberg (2002) , Gomes (2002b) , Joordens et al. (2002) , Pockett (2002b), and van de Grind (2002) apply to different aspects of the folk model. The problems may be with our intuitive acceptance of a prescientific folk model rather than with the data or the structure of the universe (see Banks & Farber, in press) . Consider the situation if the folk model were not violated, that is, if the report of the intention to act came with no preceding readiness potential or other brain activity. In such a case we would be facing a greater mystery. Such a lack of precursors would imply that the intention originated somewhere else than the brain, and this extra-brain origin of motivation would revive the specter of substance dualism (pun unavoidable). This specter was probably in the folk model from the beginning, and a worthy project would be to develop a model that can become part of our common sense that does not assume a ghostly agent.
The editors of this journal believe that this set of articles represents a milestone in a debate that has been ongoing for nearly 40 years. We hope that the legacy of this debate will be scientific progress in the understanding of time and the brain.
